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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Accountants-Unauthorized Practice of Law in Federal Tax Matters
A recent California lower court decision, Agran v. Shapiro,1 has
rekindled the dispute between lawyers and accountants as to what con-
stitutes the unauthorized practice of law2 in the federal taxation field,
and the issues involved have not yet been settled.8  These issues are
relatively new because of the increasing complexity of federal tax prob-
lems in recent years.4 Although efforts have been made by the lawyers
and accountants to settle their disputes, 5 these efforts have been nulli-
fied to some extend by such cases as .Agran, in which the two pro-
fessions have filed amicus curiae briefs.
In order to understand the issues in the Agran case, it is necessary
to refer to some of the related cases for background purposes. Many
cases, concerning laymen, including accountants, in the unauthorized
practice controversy, have involved advertising in one form or another,
and the courts, especially where the layman has designated himself as
a "tax expert" or the like,7 have prohibited such advertising. This
seems to be a fair result since the general practitioner of law cannot
advertise or hold himself out to the public as a specialist.8 Moreover,
'Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P. 2d 619 (Cal. App. Dep't 1954). According to
40 A.B.A.J. 775n. (1954), judgment was stayed pending application to the U. S.
Supreme Court.
2The practice of law embraces conveyancing, the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such action and proceeding on behalf of clients before judges and courts, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and in general all advice to clients
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law. People ex rel.
Courtney v. Ass'n of Real Estate Taxpayers of Illinois, 354 IIl. 102, 109, 187
N. E. 823, 826 (1933).
'The judge, writing the Agran opinion, said that the avenue is open for
review by the Supreme Court because of the federal constitutional question.
Apparently, this question arises because of the conflict between state law and
certain federal regulations: 26 U. S. C. A. § 1111, Rule 2 (Supp. 1953), which
applies to practice before the Tax Court; and 31 CoDE FED. REGS. § 10.2 (f)
(1949), which applies to practice before the Treasury Department.
'1 MERTrS, LAw OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION iii (1942).
'Statement of Principles Relating to Practice in the Field of Federal Taxa-
tion, 37 A. B. A. J. 517 (1951).
' Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N. E. 2d 27 (1943); Gardner
v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N. W. 2d 788 (1951) ; Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v.
Libutti, 100 A. 2d 406 (R. I. 1953); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of
America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N. E. 2d 349 (1941).
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, supra note 6; Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Tax-
payers of America, supra note 6; Gardner v. Conway, supra note 6.8 Mandelbam v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 169 Misc. 656, 290 N. Y. Supp.
462 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936); Gardner v. Conway, supra note 6; THE CANONS OF
PRorESsioNAL ETHICS OF THE AmEImCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, §§ 27, 45 (1954).
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the members of the American Institute of Accountants do not contest
these rulings.0
Also closely allied to the main issues in the principal dispute are
those cases where laymen, not necessarily within the three classes of
accountants,' 0 and corporations have participated in the adjustment
of state or municipal tax assessments. Thus, where a layman or a
corporation attempted to reduce property tax assessments,,. to reduce
sales taxes,12 to recover illegally collected occupation taxes,13 or to
advise in a tax foreclosure suit,' 4 the courts have held that these lay-
men and corporations were practicing law and as a result have declared
their contracts void for illegality,15 have held these laymen in contempt
of court,'" have enjoined such practices,' 7 and have found them guilty
of a misdemeanor'18
Where laymen are permitted to represent their clients under the
rules of certain state administrative boards, 19 some courts have held
that it does not matter whether the unauthorized practice was done in
the office, before a court, or before an administrative tribunal. The
real test, according to these courts, is "the character of the act done, and
not the place where it is committed. ' 20 The fact that the administra-
tive tribunals permit laymen to practice before them is of no avail
according to these courts, because it is the inherent power of the judi-
ciary to define and regulate the practice of law; and the legislature
oStatement of Principles Relating to Practice in the Field of Federal Taxa-
tion, 37 A. B. A. J. 517 (1951); BY-LAWS, NoRTH CAROLiNA Ass'N oF CERTI-
ED PuBaic ACCOUNTANTS, INC., Art. XVII, § 2 (1952).
"
0These classes are: (a) certified public accountants (authorized by law to
use their title to certify financial statements); (b) public accountants; and (c)
bookkeepers and others. 17 UNAUTHORIZED PRAcricE NEWS 3 (Dec. 1951).
"
1Bump v. District Court of Polk County, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N. W. 2d 914
(1942) ; Stack v. P. G. Garage, Inc., 7 N. J. 118, 80 A. 2d 545 (1951) ; Kountz
v. Rowlands, 46 Pa. D. & C. 461 (1943) ; People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n of
Real Estate Taxpayers of Illinois, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N. E. 823 (1933).
" Mandelbaum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 160 Misc. 656, 290 N. Y.
Supp. 462 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936).
"Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38
N. E. 2d 349 (1941).
1, State ex rel. Hunter v. Daugherty, 136 Neb. 490, 286 N. W. 783 (1939).15Mandelbaum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 160 Misc. 656, 290 N. Y. Supp.
462 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936) ; Stack v. P. G. Garage, Inc., 7 N. J. 118, 80 A. 2d
545 (1951).
"Bump v. District Court of Polk County, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N. W. 2d 914
(1942) ; State ex rel. Hunter v. Daugherty, 136 Neb. 490, 286 N. W. 783 (1939) ;
People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n of Real Estate Taxpayers of Illinois, 354 Ill.
102, 187 N. E. 823 (1933).
" Kountz v. Rowlands, 46 Pa. D. & C. 461 (1943); Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N. E. 2d 349 (1941).
18 Stack v. P. G. Garage, Inc., 7 N. J. 118, 80 A. 2d 545 (1951).
10 People ex. rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. 2d 941
(1937) (industrial commission); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of
America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N. E. 2d 349 (1941) (department of finance).
20 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 357, 8 N. E.
2d 941, 947 (1937).
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can only make provisions to punish those acts which the judiciary has
found to constitute the unauthorized practice of law.21 However, other
cases hold that since the legislature cannot tell the judiciary who shall
be attorneys, the courts cannot tell the administrative boards whom
they shall receive before them when these boards have the power to
formulate their own rules.22
In the field of federal taxation the problem of what constitutes
the unauthorized practice of law becomes more complicated. "The
ascertainment of probable tax effects of transactions frequently is
within the function of either a certified public accountant or a lawyer." 23
Apparently the two professions were in accord that when these ascer-
tainments raise uncertainties over the interpretation of tax or general
law, the accountant should advise his client to enlist the aid of a law-
yer.24  However, a sharp line cannot be drawn here because the ac-
countant, in order to work effectively with figures, must have an
adequate acquaintance with departmental rulings and judicial decisions
which federal taxation has produced.25
The state courts have gone so far as to permit the accountant or
layman to fill out simple income tax returns. 20  However, where the
layman, incidental to the preparation of the return, solved "knotty
questions of law," such as deciding whether a man could file a joint
return with his common-law wife and whether she could be a partner
in his trucking business when he had control but shared the profits,27
advised as to the tax advantages and disadvantages' of corporations
and partnerships, merger and dissolution of corporations, and the in-
crease and decrease of capital stock,2 8 advised modification of con-
tracts, interpreted laws, and gave opinions to effect compliance with
the tax laws,29 the state courts have held this to be the unauthorized
practice of law.
The Agran case followed the "knotty question of law" test. The
plaintiff, who was the auditor and accountant for a corporation owned
"t re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313 (1935); See
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 352, 8 N. E. 2d 941,
947 (1937).22Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 217
Cal. 244, 18 P. 2d 341 (1933); Comment, 35 MIcEr. L. REv. 442 (1937); accord,
Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Libutti, 100 A. 2d 406 (R. I. 1953).
2 Statement of Principles Relating to Practice in the Field of Federal Taxa-
tion, 37 A. B. A. 3. 517, 537 (1951).
Ibid.2
-See Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 183, 52 N. E. 2d 27, 32 (1943).2 Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N. E. 2d 27 (1943) ; Blair v.
Motor Carriers Service Bureau, Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (1939).2 Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N. W. 2d 788 (1951).
2 Blair v. Motor Carriers Service Bureau, Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (1939).2 Application of New York County Lawyers Ass'n In re Standard Tax &
Management Corp., 43 N. Y. S. 2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
[Vol. 33
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by the defendant, prepared the defendant's individual tax returns. He
sued the defendant for the services rendered to him as an individual,30
which services consisted of advising the defendant on certain carry-
back losses and subsequent conferences with revenue agents which
ultimately led to a reduction of the amount due the government by
the defendant. The court held the contract void for illegality on the
ground that the advice involved the question whether the loss could
be carried back, and this in turn depended on whether it was a loss
attributable to the operation of a trade or business regularly carried
on by the taxpayer within the meaning of that phrase as used in the
Internal Revenue Code.
The Agran decision and the Gardner v. Conwa301 decision, by their
holdings and dicta, rejected the "incidental" test which was used by
an intermediate. New York court. The New York court held Bercu,
a certified public accountant, guilty of contempt of court when he ad-
vised a corporation that it could take certain unpaid 1935-1937 city
taxes as deductions if paid in 1943 even though the company was on
the accrual basis.32 The court, basing its decision on the necessity of
protecting the public against incompetent legal service, held that since
Bercu was not the company's regular auditor, he could not be called
in for a fee to interpret the law. However, the court implied that if
Bercu had been the company's regular auditor, he could have solved
this question as an incident of that regular job without being in con-
tempt of court.
The Agran, Bercu, and Gardner cases by necessity deal directly or
indirectly with federal administrative rules in the federal tax field. The
Federal Administrative Procedure Act does not "grant or deny to any
person who is not a lawyer the right to appear for or represent others
before any agency or in any agency proceeding,"33 but specific statutes34
give the Tax Court and the Treasury Department the right to make
their own rules of procedure. The Tax Court permits laymen to
argue before it on the conditions that they be of good moral character
and pass a written and sometimes oral examination, while a lawyer
is automatically admitted if he is a member in good standing of the
bar of the highest court in his state or the Supreme Court of the United
'
0 Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P. 2d 619 (Cal. App. Dep't 1954). Plaintiff sued for
$2,000.00. The court reversed and remanded, saying that the plaintiff could
not recover for services which were illegal but that he could recover the value
of the services which were legal.
" Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N. W. 2d 788 (1951).
" Application of New York County Lawyers Ass'n In re Bercu, 273 App.
Div. 524, 78 N. Y. S. 2d (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd without opinion, 299 N. Y.
728, 87 N. E. 2d 451 (1949).
"60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § 1005a (1952).
"53 STAT. 159 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 1111 (1952) (Tax Court); 23 STAT.
258 (1884), 5 U. S. C. § 261 (1952) (Treasury Department).
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States.3 5 The latter Court has upheld the power of the Tax Court to
make such a rule.86 The rule of the Treasury Department gives any
properly enrolled agent, including accountants, the same rights, powers
and privileges that enrolled lawyers have before the Department. How-
ever, enrolled agents cannot prepare any instrument which transfers
title to personal or real property for the purpose of affecting federal
taxes, "nor shall such enrolled agent advise a client as to the legal
sufficiency of such an instrument or its legal effect upon the federal
taxes of such client: and provided further, that nothing in the regula-
tion in this part shall be construed as authorizing persons not members
of the bar to practice law.' 3 Relying on the last phrase, the court
in the Agran case held the contract void for illegality.
The most important issue between the lawyers and the accountants
is whether the federal administrative rules are binding on the state
courts. The Florida court has held that a person who was admitted
to practice before the Tax Court, the Treasury Department, and the
Supreme Court of the United States could not practice as a federal
tax counsel in Florida unless he was a member of the Florida bar,
even though the federal agencies before which he intended to practice
permitted him to do so.38 The Missouri court, on the other hand, held
that a layman, who was permitted to practice before the Interstate
Commerce Commission under the rules of that agency, could collect
for services rendered to his client even though such a contract was
void tnder the state's public policy protecting the public against in-
competent legal service. The court said that the contract was made
legal by federal law, and if the court declared the contract void for
illegality, it would be interfering with a federal function. 9
The Supreme Court of the United States, if and when it decides
the issues presented in such cases as Agran, will be faced with the prob-
lem of whether states, by court action, can interpret federal adminis-
trative regulations so as to deprive the accountants of their federal
right to advise their clients in federal tax matters. Sooner or later,
the Supreme Court will be faced with a case where the accountant is
admitted to practice before the Tax Court, but who has been barred
from that practice by a state court, even though the rules of the Tax
Court do not contain a clause saying that nothing shall be construed
-- 26 U. S. C. A. § 1111, Rule 2 (Supp. 1953).
16Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926),
where the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel defendant to admit him
to practice before the defendant, whose rules, at that time gave the Board dis-
cretion to refuse any certified public accountant the right to practice before it.
1"31 CoDE Fa. REGs. § 10.2 (f) (1949).
" Petition of Kearney, 63 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1953).
" De Pass v. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S. W. 2d 146 (1940); In
re Lyon, 301 Mass. 30, 16 N. E. 2d 74 (1938); accord, Brooks v. Mandel-White
Co., 54 F. 2d 992 (2nd Cir. 1932).
(Vol. 3
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to permit a person not a member of the bar to practice law. Then the
Court will have to decide whether the federal regulations are superior
to state public policy.
If the Supreme Court hears the Agran case, it could follow the
Bercu test and hold that since Agran was the defendant's regular ac-
countant, he could solve legal problems incidental to the preparing
of the defendant's return. If the Court rejects the Bercu test it could
hold with Agranis "knotty question of law" test, but would have to
interpret the regulations involved. The difficult question, as related
to the Agran case, is whether the Treasury Department rule which
says "that nothing in the regulation . . . shall be construed as authoriz-
ing persons not members of the bar to practice law" forbids Agran
to give the type of advice he gave. The state courts by their interpre-
tation of this clause, have practically limited the accountant to filling
out simple income tax returns. The Court could find that by such
an interpretation the rights and privileges granted to laymen under
the regulation are practically nullified because it is rare that a tax-
payer, who files a simple income tax return, would need representa-
tion of any kind before the Treasury Department.
Furthermore, if the issues presented in the Agran case are ever
argued before the Court, it will undoubtedly uphold the right of the Tax
Court and the Treasury Department to make their own rules, and it
would seem that the Court would also say that the federal law in this
field is superior to state public policy because the representation of
federal taxpayers must be free from state interference.
Public policy prohibition of incompetent legal service is the basis
upon which the state courts have refused to allow the accountants to
interpret "questions of law" in the federal income tax field; but as
a practical matter taxable business income is, to a large extent, deter-
mined by such accounting factors as inventory pricing, capital trans-
actions, prepaid income and expenses, depreciation and bad debt write-
offs. The protection of the public is, indeed, a very important con-
sideration in these cases; consequently, the courts should consider the
dual cost to the taxpayer of paying an accountant and a lawyer for
advice that is not exclusively of a legal nature.40 A bill41 has been
submitted to Congress, which if passed, would alleviate this problem by
allowing properly enrolled accountants to engage in the settlement of
"According to the American Institute of Accountants, 55,960,236 income tax
returns were filed during the fiscal year of 1952. Out of this number, 9,400
cases required discussion for settlement at upper levels of the Revenue Service,
1,200 cases were decided in the Tax Court, and only 636 were decided in courts
of law.
"H. R. 9922, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954).
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their clients' tax liability with the Internal Revenue Service on a more
extensive basis than the state courts now permit.
HERBERT S. FALK, JR.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-State Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations for Collection of Use Taxes
Defendant, a Delaware corporation, occasionally sold furniture to
Maryland residents who came to defendant's Delaware store to make
purchases. Some of the purchases were consigned to Maryland ad-
dresses and shipped by common carrier, while others were delivered
directly to Maryland customers by defendant's truck. Defendant was
not qualified or registered to do business in Maryland, maintained no
branch office or agencies there, and solicited no orders from Maryland
residents through traveling salesmen, mail or telephone. The Mary-
land Court of Appeals ruled that the Delaware corporation was en-
gaged in business in the state within the meaning of the Maryland use
tax statute,' and consequently liable for the collection of the use tax 2
from its Maryland customers. 3 In reversing the Maryland court, the
United States Supreme Court (four justices dissenting) held that
Maryland had no jurisdiction over defendant corporation, and, there-
fore, to require it to collect a use tax was a violation of due process.4
In previous cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state may
'MD. ANN. CoDa, art. 81 § 371 (1951) provides: "Every vendor engaged in
business in this state and making sales of tangible personal property for use,
storage or consumption in this state which are taxable under the provisions of
this subtitle, at the time of making such sales, or if the use, storage or consump-
tion becomes taxable hereunder, shall collect the tax imposed by this sub-title
from the purchaser." 368(k) of the same act defines the term "engaged in
business in this state" as selling or delivering in the state, or any activity in
connection therewith, tangible personal property for use, storage or consumption
within the state.
2 The purpose of the use tax is to complement and support the sales tax,
usually in two respects. First, it protects state merchants from competition with
out-of-state merchants whose sales are not taxed, and second, it prevents the
loss of state revenue by removing from its residents the advantage of non-taxed
out-of-state purchases.
'Miller Brothers v. State of Maryland, 201 Md. 535, 95 A 2d 286 (1953).
Maryland entered suit against defendant to recover use taxes assessed by the
state comptroller and attached a station wagon belonging to defendant. De-
fendant filed a petition to quash the writ of attachment on the grounds that the
assessment was unconstitutional. In holding that the defendant was subject
to the use tax statute the court relied on the fact that it delivered merchandise
to purchasers in Maryland. Other factors advanced on argument for holding
defendant liable were as follows: (a) Defendant delivered some purchases to
common carriers consigned to Maryland addresses. (b) It occasionally mailed
sales circulars to all former customers, including Maryland customers. (c) It
advertised with Delaware papers and radio stations knowing that such adver-
tisements would reach Maryland inhabitants.
'Miller Brothers v. State of Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 342 (1954) : "Seizure
of property by the state under pretext of taxation when there is no jurisdiction
or power to tax is simple- confiscation and a denial of due process of law."
[Vol. 33
